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--- start [2026/08/11 00:23] – [Welcome to NARSOL’s State Registry Information Wiki!] josiahk
+++ start [2026/08/11 00:25] (current) – [Welcome to NARSOL’s State Registry Information Wiki!] josiahk
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  <font 16px/Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;;inherit;;inherit>or</font>  [[wiki@narsol.org|by email]].\\
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- <font 16px/Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;;inherit;;inherit>Federal SORNA, enacted as the Adam Walsh Act in 2006, sets minimum national standards for registration rather than operating registries itself. Because Congress cannot commandeer state systems, it relies on its spending power: states, territories, and tribes that fail to "substantially implement" its requirements, including a three-tier offense-based classification with 15-year, 25-year, and lifetime registration periods, in-person verification, collection of internet identifiers, and public website disclosure, lose 10 percent of their annual Byrne JAG grant funding. The DOJ's SMART Office evaluates compliance and permits reasonable deviations, and in practice states are financially pressured but not legally compelled to conform: Some restructured their statutes to pursue compliance, others simply absorb the penalty, and fewer than half of all states have ever been found substantially compliant.</font>
+ <font 16px/Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;;inherit;;inherit>Federal SORNA, enacted as the Adam Walsh Act in 2006, sets minimum national standards for registration rather than operating registries itself. Because Congress cannot commandeer state systems, it relies on its spending power: states, territories, and tribes that fail to "substantially implement" its requirements, including a three-tier offense-based classification with 15-year, 25-year, and lifetime registration periods, in-person verification, collection of internet identifiers, and public website disclosure, lose 10 percent of their annual Byrne JAG grant funding. The DOJ's SMART Office evaluates compliance and permits reasonable deviations, and in practice states are financially pressured but not legally compelled to conform: Some states restructured their statutes to pursue compliance, others simply absorb the penalty, and fewer than half of all states have ever been found substantially compliant.</font>
 [[https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title34/subtitle2/chapter209/subchapter1&edition=prelim|Federal SORNA statute: 34 USC Subtitle II, CHAPTER 209, SUBCHAPTER I]]